"I think you hit a reset button for the fall campaign. Everything changes. It's almost like an Etch-a-Sketch; you can kind of shake it up, and we start all over again." -Eric Fehrnstrom, Senior Advisor to Mitt Romney, March 21, 2012.
How malleable is candidate positioning? To appeal to voters, political candidates often deflect attention away from unpopular policy votes they have cast or unpopular positions they have taken in primaries. This rebranding can occur by emphasizing other facets of the candidates' platforms, obfuscating the unpopular positions, or simply ignoring the topics. Simultaneously, opponents and independent issue organizations try to ensure that voters are aware of these unpopular positions, and increase their importance to voters. This manuscript reports the results of a field experiment designed to test the efficacy of an independent organization's effort to change voters' perceptions of an incumbent candidate by correcting their misinformed beliefs about the candidate's policy positions (i.e., reframe the candidate).
There are several good reasons to be skeptical that independent organizations can successfully reframe candidates, especially incumbents. Efforts to reframe incumbent candidates can be stymied at each step of the communications process. The messages from independent organizations may not be heard. Not only are voters largely inattentive (Erikson et al 2004) , messages may be drowned out in the blizzard of competing messages (Fowler and Ridout 2010) . Even if messages are received, many voters will choose to reject the information in the messages (Kuklinski et al. 2000) . For those voters open to the new the framings of incumbents, the policy positions that are the foci of the reframing efforts must be important enough to voters that it influences their candidate choices (Miller and Krosnick 2000; Lau and Redslawsk 2006; Guisinger 2009 ). Moreover, the reframing must last long enough to influence the actual vote choice, and not just be a fleeting change in candidate perception (Gerber, Gimpel, Green, and Shaw 2011) . Furthermore, candidates who have been in the public eye for years before a given election (i.e., incumbents) can cultivate a moderate image by obfuscating unpopular views and by emphasizing moderate parts of their positions on a given issue (Grose et al. 2013) . After voters form beliefs about the positions and values of politicians, these beliefs can be very sticky and difficult to dislodge (Bullock 2007; Nyhan and Reifler 2010) . Thus, independent organizations face an uphill struggle to reframe incumbent candidates -especially when the elections are high profile and involve many competing messages.
Our experiment measures the effectiveness of efforts to reframe a candidate by independent organizations in a high-profile political context in which detecting a treatment effect is particularly unlikely. The campaign was for a popular and well known incumbent in one of the most expensive US Senate races in the country. Despite these contextual hurdles, an inexpensive campaign conducted by two pro-choice organizations successfully caused voters in the randomly selected treatment group to correctly identify the incumbent candidate as opposing abortion rights, and to shift their votes towards the pro-choice challenger. Specifically, we find that the treatment corrected the misperception among one-third of those who mistakenly believed that the incumbent was pro-choice, while two-thirds of those voters maintained their false beliefs after the treatment was administered. The treatment also shifted the vote choice in our experiment universe by considerably more than the 3 point margin of victory achieved by the challenger. These results demonstrate that when elections are close, shifting voters' perceptions of incumbent legislators' positions can pay considerable electoral dividends.
Theory
Politicians want to be viewed by voters as positively as possible, which is why holding unpopular policy positions creates strategic challenges for them. To the extent that voters' candidate preferences are motivated by policy substance, staking out a position that is out of synch with voters' opinions could be costly. Politicians have three basic strategy options for navigating this situation. The first option is to explain their unpopular policy positions their constituents in order to either move voters' preferences so they better align with the candidates', or to at least minimize the unpopularity of the policy positions (Fenno 1978; Lenz 2012 ). This option is the most normatively appealing because it provides voters with accurate information on which to base their candidate choices.
A second option is to ignore or downplay unpopular positions by either sidestepping the issues altogether (Franklin 1991) or only addressing them when communicating with voters whose preferences on the issues already align with the candidates' (Hillygus and Shields 2008) . Ignoring the issues avoids priming them in voters' minds. One incidental consequence of this can be that voters come to (mistakenly) assume that their preferred positions on the issues are shared by the candidates (Ross, Greene, and House 1977) . If the unpopular positions would be unimportant to voters, the issue may not affect voters' candidate choices, in which case voters' ignorance would be of no consequence to election outcomes. However, if candidates' unpopular positions would be important to voters, then failing to directly address them hinders the ability of voters to make informed decisions (Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Bullock 2011 ).
The final option available to candidates is to intentionally obfuscate their true position on an issue by referencing related but distinctly different popular policy positions so as to appear more aligned with voters' preferences. Grose, Malhotra, and Van Houweling (2013) show that not only do US Senators craft letters to constituents who disagree with their positions on immigration by emphasizing agreement on topics related to immigration, but that voters exposed to these letters mistakenly believe the Senators legislative votes are in line with voters' preference on immigration. Rogers and Norton (2011) demonstrate experimentally that even in the context of political debates in which candidates are asked explicit policy questions, voters often fail to notice this obfuscation. While not explicitly misrepresenting policy positions, these experiments illustrate how such obfuscation tactics are not only effective in muting opposition but also in creating the conditions for misinformation to arise and take hold among voters about candidates' true positions.
However, candidates do not operate in a vacuum and organizations opposing them often employ strategies to hold candidates accountable for their unpopular positions. In one sense, merely alerting voters to the unpopular positions taken by candidates should be easy messages to convey, but the messages need to be heard, accepted, and about issues that are sufficiently important to voters to change vote choice. That causal chain could be short-circuited at each step in the process, preventing organizations from successfully reframing voters' perceptions of candidates -even when their current perceptions are based on false information). This may help to explain why policy attacks by challengers often create confusion (Franklin 1991) .
The first challenge is for organizations to expose voters to their messages. While researchers testing messages in the laboratory or a survey can be reasonably confident that participants will receive the intended messages, organizations operating in real electorate environments have no such guarantee. Getting the attention of voters is not easy and messages may be missed or diluted amid a blizzard of competing messages on a diverse range of issues from other campaigns and organizations.
Furthermore, information sources that are universally recognized as impartial and objective rarely, if ever, exist in the political realm. This leads to voters selectively choosing to consume trusted media and to avoid media outlets deemed untrustworthy (Kull et al. 2003; Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Baum and Groeling 2008) . If the only voters who are effectively exposed to organizations' candidate reframing messages are those who are disposed to agree with the messages, then such efforts will be unlikely to change vote choices.
Even if a sizable fraction of voters do not filter out the messages and are therefore effectively exposed to the reframing information, they may not be receptive to the messages and might therefore reject their veracity. If the messenger organizations are not viewed as credible, voters may be motivated to spontaneously argue against the messages (Kuklinski et al. 2000; Taber and Lodge 2006; Nyhan and Riefler 2010) . Even if the information about the unpopular positions are viewed as factually accurate, voters may correctly update their beliefs but re-interpret the meaning of policy positions (Gaines et al. 2007 ). Motivated reasoning can cause messages to be actively resisted by partisansespecially in competitive messaging environments in which multiple facts and frames can cancel each other out (Chong and Druckman 2007a,b) .
Voters are not empty vessels, however. They often hold incorrect beliefs about candidates' policy positions, and experimental research in laboratories has found that dislodging such misinformation is extremely difficult. Nyhan and Reifler (2010) conducted a series of experiments in which they exposed participants to news stories containing misinformation which was subsequently corrected. They found that the corrections not only failed to correct the misinformation but actually caused the mistaken beliefs to become more entrenched. Similarly, Bullock (2007) found that even when the authoritative source of misinformation corrects the record, people are still more likely to believe the misinformation than before they heard it. At the very least, exposing voters to new information that contradicts their pre-existing beliefs about candidates can create confusion and uncertainty. Since voters do not cast votes based on uncertain policy positions (Alvarez 1998) , organizations trying to reframe candidates in voters' minds may cause the target to discount the preexisting mistaken information but not create any new votes.
Even if opposition groups successfully convince voters that the incumbent holds an unpopular policy position, the policy position must be sufficiently important to be pivotal in voters' decision calculus to change their vote. Party loyalty is the most important determinant of how people vote (Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002) , but deeply held issue attitudes that are important to people are capable of overwhelming partisanship (Converse 1964; Bullock 2011) . For issues that are unimportant to voters, the popularity of the candidates' positions on the issues are inconsequential to election outcomes. In fact, if voters like and trust a candidate, they may change their policy preferences (rather than their candidate preference) to be in alignment with their preferred candidate (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Lenz 2009 Lenz , 2012 . Thus, reframing candidates will only affect election outcomes when the candidate policy positions about which they are communicating are important to voters.
Despite these hurdles to having an impact on voters' candidate choice, organizations do attempt to hold candidates accountable and make voters aware of unpopular positions. The experiment described in the next section measures the efficacy of an information campaign by independent organizations in a high-profile race. More specifically, it examines the extent to which misinformation about an incumbent Senator can be corrected through a low-cost campaign, and whether correcting this information can affect voters' candidate choices.
Election context
The 2008 For his part, the incumbent Senator Smith did his best to downplay abortion as an issue and said very little about the topic throughout the campaign. Smith was pro-life, but supported stem cell research and international family planning (Mapes 2008) , which earned him a 40% score from NARAL (Sandman 2008 ) and a 50% score from the National Right to Life Coalition (On the Issues 2006). Smith's strategy was to emphasize his centrist credentials, Democratic endorsements (Taniel 2008) , and respect for Barack Obama (Chisholm 2008) .
Planned Parenthood Advocates of Oregon and NARAL Pro-Choice Oregon conducted a large scale survey and discovered that a majority of the Oregon electorate was unaware that Smith was pro-life and mistakenly believed that he was pro-choice. The two organizations conducted a collaborative campaign to communicate to targeted citizens the information that Gordon Smith was pro-life. Compared to the overall spending in Oregon in 2008, any intervention from these organizations was going to be extremely small. FEC reports indicate that $20 million was spent directly by the Senate campaigns ($11 million by Gordon Smith alone). Oregon voters were deluged with communication for other offices as well, with the FEC reporting $10 million spent by US House campaigns and $11 million by registered PAC's in Oregon, in addition to the $54 million spent by state-level candidates (Evilsizer 2009) . Amid this backdrop of intense electoral activity, the experimental treatment described in the next section consisted of three simple mailers and a phone call.
Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted on two distinct samples. The first sample was defined earlier in Table A1 , Panel A). The sample that comes from the survey conducted in 2006 contained more women (86%), more Democrats (62%), fewer Independents (21%), and had higher rates of turnout (94% turnout in 2004 and 84% in 2006) (see Table A1 , Panel B).
The individuals in the experiment universe were randomly assigned to either treatment or control conditions. Those in the treatment condition received three mailings (see Appendix B) and one phone call (see Appendix C The random assignment to treatment and control conditions assures that the only difference between the two groups is the application of the treatment. As expected, observed covariates are balanced across treatment and control conditions for both the 2006 and 2008 samples (see Table A1 ).
This comparability across treatment and control groups allows us to attribute systematic differences between the treatment and control groups to the treatment itself. Voter attitudes were measured after Election Day using live phone interviews for all individuals in the experiment universe between Thursday, November 6 and Sunday, November 9 (see Appendix D for the text of the survey). We received valid responses for 1,805 citizens in the 2008 sample and 3,214 in the 2006 sample for a healthy total response rate of 22%. So while we are unable to know how non-respondents were affected by the treatment, our sample is fairly representative of the entire sample targeted by the campaign. A nice feature of this design is that the measure of candidate choice was collected by a completely separate organization with no knowledge of the treatment assignment. Thus, the treatment effects we detect are only those that endured from when the treatments were administered to when the post-election surveys were collected; that is, the treatment effects we detect already reflect any decay that might have occurred over the intervening weeks (Gerber, Green, and Gimpel 2012) .
The joint NARAL and Planned Parenthood campaign that we report here should be understood 
Expectations
Two parameters are of interest in this study: first, the percentage of misinformed voters that can be corrected through a straightforward field intervention; second, the percentage of voters persuaded to switch votes from Smith to Merkley because of this misinformation correction treatment.
Since the bulk of the extant laboratory experiments on this topic have focused on detecting and measuring resistance to messages and the persistence of misinformation, it is unclear how they should inform our priors. One very similar field experiment was conducted by Arceneaux and Kolodny (2009a, b) in two Pennsylvania state legislative races. They found the informational campaign was resisted by people of the same party as the candidate and actually served as a negative cue by voters who disagreed with the independent organization.
The biggest difference between that study and the current one is that voters in the Arceneaux where a large number of Republicans were targeted). To the extent that our target population engages in motivated reasoning, it is likely to be sympathetic to the sponsoring organizations and move away from the Republican Gordon Smith. Since abortion is a simple party-defining issue, the effect of the treatment on vote choice is likely to be larger for this campaign than campaigns focused on complex or cross-cutting policies (Hurley and Hill 2003) . That said, Alvarez and Franklin (1994) find that voters are most certain in identifying incumbent positions regarding abortion, so it is possible that the treatment is incapable of correcting voter misinformation in the first place.
Results
The first question we address is the degree to which the pro-choice voters targeted by the campaign were misinformed about Smith's position in the absence of the treatment. Among those identified as being pro-choice in 2008, only 52% could correctly identify the incumbent, Smith, as being pro-life (see Table 1 , Panel A, row "Control"). The percentage of respondents able to identify Smith's position as pro-life was higher in the sample identified in 2006 (69%, see Table 1 , Panel B, row "Control"), but still nowhere near 100%. While one might expect people with more extreme views on abortion (i.e., those who believe abortion should be "generally available" as opposed to those who think it should be available "with restrictions") to be more informed on the incumbent's position, no systematic difference is observed in the accuracy of those two groups of voters' in the control group in the experiment. Thus, we find that a large proportion of pro-choice voters in Oregon were misinformed about their incumbent candidate's position on abortion.
The second question we address is whether the informational campaign conducted by NARAL and Planned Parenthood managed to cut through the din of other electoral information and was accepted by voters in the treatment group. Among the citizens identified in 2008 as being pro-choice (see Table 1 , Panel A, row "Treatment"), 68% in the treatment group were able to correctly identify Smith as pro-life. That is, the treatment improved factual knowledge about the policy position of the incumbent by 16 percentage points relative to the comparable control group. This difference is not only statistically significant, but also represents a full third of the 48% of citizens who were misinformed. No statistically relevant difference was observed between citizens who think abortion should be "generally available" and those who think "restrictions on abortion are necessary," which suggests that the treatment was received and accepted by both groups. Examining the sample of citizens identified as pro-choice in 2006 (see Table 1 Table A2 ). While the treatment definitely affected the information levels of voters, it did not inspire voter turnout.
Since the campaign's treatment conveyed specific information about the candidates' abortion policy positions, the fourth question to address is whether the treatment increased the pro-choice challenger Merkley's vote share relative to the pro-life incumbent Smith. The campaign did increase Merkley vote share for both samples (see Table 2 , column "Overall"). Among citizens identified as prochoice in 2008, the treatment group (45.3%) was 4.5 percentage points more supportive of Merkley (i.e., opposing the pro-life incumbent, Smith) than the control group (40.7%). That is, the campaign shifted the two-party vote share a full 9 percentage points (Control: 40.7% vs. 59.3% = -18.6%; Treatment:
45.3% vs. 54.7% = -9.4%). The effect size in the 2006 sample was similar where the treatment raised support for Merkley from 71.5% to 74.8% for a 3.4 percentage point increase in Merkley vote share, which is a 6.6 increase in two party vote-share (Control: 71.5% vs. 28.5% = 43%; Treatment: 74.8% vs.
25.2% = 49.6%). These effects in both 2008 and 2006 cross traditional thresholds for statistical significance and are larger than Merkley's ultimate margin of victory. Recall that the macro issue that dominated this election was the economy. In that context, a treatment that corrected widespread policy misinformation about a well-liked incumbent was received, believed, corrective, and effective at changing vote choice.
This change in voter behavior occurred almost entirely among citizens who believe abortion should be "generally available" (see Table 2 , column "Available"). Citizens believing abortion should be generally available exhibited treatment effects of 8. as believing restrictions should be placed on abortion (see Table 2 , column "Restrict") did not change their votes in response to the treatment. The pattern was similar for citizens identified in 2006 as supporting more restricted abortion rights, where the effect of the treatment was a statistically insignificant 1.9 percentage points. These heterogeneous treatment effects suggest that correcting voters' misinformation mattered only when the voters had an extreme position on the issue of abortion (see Figure 2 ).
Our samples are large by the standards of laboratory and survey based work (1,805 citizens in the 2008 sample and 3,214 in the 2006 sample completed the post-survey), so our ability to detect heterogeneous treatment effects is not trivial. That said, we find no systematic evidence of heterogeneity beyond our primary hypothesis about a citizen's opinion regarding abortion. Citizens varying in age, gender, and median household income show more or less constant response to the treatment. Those who reported in a previous survey that they supported Smith are 5 percentage points more responsive to treatment than all other respondents who had previously expressed a candidates preference, but this effect is not remotely close to statistical significance and could be due to the sampling variance (p = .41). Thus, our data suggests that attitudes about abortion are the principal moderating variable and otherwise the effect is relatively constant across a broad change of subject characteristics.
Discussion
The experiment reported in this manuscript provides proof that low-cost information campaigns can affect voters' beliefs and candidate choices in high-profile, high-budget elections. While field experiments are increasingly common in political science, nearly all of them have been focused on turnout rather than persuasion (for exceptions see: Arceneaux and Nickerson 2010; Gerber, Green and Gimpel 2011; Rogers and Middleton 2013) and the vast majority have been conducted in low salience elections where it is easier for treatments to be noticed. In contrast, our experiment studied an effort conducted during a Senate election decided by a win margin of 3 percentage points in a state where $95 million was spent across all-levels of electoral campaigns. Despite all this electoral spending and activity, the 3 pieces of mail (at $0.75 apiece) and a volunteer phone call ($1 apiece) aimed at clearing up ambiguity about an incumbent US Senator's position on abortion shifted two-party vote share by nearly 9 percentage points in one sample and 6.6 points in the other. Our experiment demonstrates that organizations interested in reframing candidates can do so effectively, even in the face competing messages benefiting from much larger budgets.
Our findings speak to the debate on whether campaigns matter (e.g., Gelman and King 1993; Holbrook 1996; Gerber 2004) , and highlight a limitation of analyses of election outcomes that rely principally on economic performance (or whatever the plurality of voters say is the "most important issue" at that time). In 2008, the economy was the most important issue in the election, trumping even the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. While cultural issues are never completely divorced from voting decisions, survey research did not deem abortion to be a critical issue on voters' minds in Oregon during this election. Yet, we find that correcting voters' misinformed beliefs about the incumbent's policy position on this issue shifted vote choice by 3.4 to 4.5 percentage points, and margin by 6.6 and 9.0 percentage points. Since this election was close -with a win margin of less than three percentage points -micro-targeted, single-issue focused communication strategies like the one we studied could affect election outcomes (Hillygus and Shields, 2008) . Thus, our experiment provides evidence that campaign tactics can matter when macro-level forces create close elections. We find that these tactics can affect vote choice when the targeted policy positions link to positions that are deeply held by voters.
Our experiment also helps clarify how to interpret results from studies using respondent policy preferences to predict vote choice. We found that half of our control group was unaware of the incumbent's position on a policy that is a core part of the "Culture War" and at times used as a litmus test for both political parties. When presented with accurate information on the incumbent's position, one-third of misinformed voters updated their beliefs, and some voters with unambiguously pro-choice views altered their vote choice. This finding suggests that studies of representation that link the votes of legislators to constituent opinion capture the broad ideological fit between legislators and voters rather than reflecting direct policy feedback in which constituent opinions of legislators are causally connected to legislators' policy votes. To the extent that voters attempt to maximize weighted policy congruence, misinformation constitutes noise and models of vote choice using policy preference would perform better if citizens were provided accurate information on candidate positions.
The source of information on policy positions is an interesting direction for future research. Research designs with more detailed pre-and post-surveys would allow for future experiments to gain more precision on the dynamics of who changed their vote, and why. For example, the results suggest that voters who believed abortion should be "generally available" were the only ones to change their vote when they were disabused of misinformation regarding the incumbents' position on abortion.
One explanation for why this might have been is that pro-choice voters who prefer abortions to be "generally available" rather than "available with restrictions" also believe abortion to be a more important issue to them personally, and therefore likely weight the issue more heavily in their vote choice -consistent with research showing that strong attitudes affect preferences and behaviors whereas weak attitudes do not (Krosnick and Petty 1995) . Another possible explanation is that the "generally available" voters realize that a pro-life candidate can effectively prevent abortion from being "generally available," whereas the "available with restrictions" voters realize that contemporary political reality is such that even a pro-life candidate likely cannot prevent some abortions from being available with restrictions. Other research questions could be addressed through more detailed pre-and post- 
